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Trust between representatives and citizens is regarded as central to effective governance in times 
of peace and uncertainty. This article tests that assumption by engaging elite and mass perspectives 
to provide a 360-degree appraisal of vertical and horizontal policy coordination in a crisis scenario. 
Specifically, a multi-dimensional conception of political trust, anchored in psychological studies of 
interpersonal relations, is operationalised in the context of the United Kingdom’s response to the 
2020 coronavirus pandemic. Detailed analysis of data collected from 1045 members of the public 
and more than 250 elected politicians suggests that particular facets of political trust and distrust 
may have contributed to levels of mass behavioural compliance and elite policy support in the 
UK at the height of the COVID-19 crisis. These findings help to evaluate policy success during a 
unique and challenging moment while contributing theoretically and methodologically to broader 
studies of political trust and governance.
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(see Anderson et al., 2020). Yet while national governments implemented a range of 
social and economic ‘lockdowns’, albeit at different paces, early reports suggested vary-
ing degrees of public support and adherence (e.g. Connolly et al., 2020; Tominey et al., 
2020). In this context, the importance of the social and behavioural sciences, including 
psycho-social concepts such as trust, quickly gained traction in both academic and prac-
titioner debates about the pandemic response (Van Bavel et al., 2020). As Devine et al. 
(2020: 2) posited in their review of emerging research, ‘Trust between governors and the 
governed could be seen as essential to facilitating good governance of the pandemic’. As 
countries around the world grapple with second or third waves of the virus and contem-
plate new tranches of long-term legal restrictions on people’s behaviour, this article draws 
on original data collected at the first peak of the virus to understand the role of political 
trust as an antecedent of mass behavioural compliance with, and elite support for, crisis-
related public policy decisions.
To the extent that political leaders were quickly made aware of epidemiological 
measures such as social distancing, contact tracing and mass testing that could counter 
the virus’s urgent threat, the COVID-19 crisis was somewhat of a ‘known unknown’ in 
the words of former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. Yet whether or not 
existing intelligence was successfully deployed relied on confident relations between 
political leaders and those they govern. From this perspective, political trust – under-
stood in sum as the willingness of citizens to make themselves vulnerable to political 
actors and institutions – can be seen as a key psychological lubricant for governing 
effectively in such times of uncertainty. In democratic polities especially, the official 
response to COVID-19 was shaped by (a) political leaders who were tasked with deliv-
ering public health announcements (and thus became the public-facing interlocutors of 
public health guidelines), (b) parliaments and legislatures who were tasked with granting 
emergency powers to sitting governments or passing legislation related to the crisis 
response and (c) democratically elected officials who had to take the difficult decisions, 
in line with scientific evidence or not, about implementing fast-paced changes to social, 
cultural and economic life.
Crises like COVID-19 do, then, place an added premium on the ‘social contract’ 
underpinning principal–agent relations in democracies, which relies fundamentally on 
conditional trust judgements by those without power in those with decision-making 
authority to act in their better interests. The importance of political trust is thus twofold 
during crises such as COVID-19. At one level, a climate of declining political trust (or 
rising distrust in the political) might reduce public compliance with political mandates 
and/or delimit politicians’ policy toolkit by structuring the viability of legitimate govern-
ance and policy making (for similar arguments, see ‘t Hart, 2011: 324–326). At another 
level, political trust between politicians might facilitate an effective crisis response by 
pushing actors towards enhanced cooperation, while distrust may hinder it by catalysing 
strategic action, anticipated reactions and partisan politicking.
Early studies of the COVID-19 crisis provide supporting evidence for the claim that 
higher levels of political trust precipitated public compliance (Goldstein and Wiedemann, 
2020; Oksanen et al., 2020; Olsen and Hjorth, 2020). These studies are limited, however, 
by measurement issues that leave the underlying causal mechanisms of this relationship 
rather opaque. For example, ‘compliance’ has been measured in the US using mobility 
data (Goldstein and Wiedemann, 2020) and in Denmark using self-reported social dis-
tancing (Olsen and Hjorth, 2020), and related conclusions have even been drawn in com-
parative studies using COVID-19 mortality rates (Oksanen et al., 2020). Similarly, trust 
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has been measured using a variety of standalone survey items (as fielded in the World 
Values Survey, Eurobarometer and European Social Surveys), but in some cases it has 
been inferred from partisanship and voter turnout (Goldstein and Wiedemann, 2020). In 
contrast, this article tackles the topic of trust, governance and COVID-19 according to 
three clear premises: that trust is a multi-dimensional concept and its relationship to polit-
ical behaviour can only be properly understood when it is measured as such; that compre-
hensive appraisals of trust and public policy require researchers to engage with both 
vertical trust between principals and agents and horizontal trust between political elites; 
and that researchers must analyse data on a range of relevant behaviours and related poli-
cies to fully understand the crisis response.
In this article, I address this knowledge gap by analysing a unique dataset gathered 
from members of the public and elected politicians in the United Kingdom. The aims and 
contributions of the article are twofold. First, this article demonstrates the theoretical and 
empirical applicability of trust as a predictor of political behaviour when it is measured at 
the individual level using multi-dimensional indicators. Findings presented later in the 
article show not only that a multifaceted measure of trust can help to explain behavioural 
and attitudinal responses to COVID-19 but also that it can reveal more precisely how and 
why the public trusts in political elites as well as when the latter’s perceptions thereof are 
out of kilter with reality. Second, this article provides a 360-degree analysis of political 
trust in a crisis scenario by engaging with those who advocate and enforce policy deci-
sions as well as those who must abide by them. Findings suggest that specific facets of 
trust and distrust were relevant to both actions at the height of the coronavirus pandemic. 
The article proceeds in four broad steps. First, the importance of trust for governance in 
times of crisis is enumerated and clarified. Second, a multi-dimensional model of trust is 
introduced that sets up a number of falsifiable hypotheses. Third, methods of data collec-
tion and associated empirical analyses are described and discussed at length. Fourth, the 
article concludes by reflecting on the academic and practical significance of the results.
Trust and Governance In and Out of Crises
Vertical trust between citizens and representatives is a necessary feature of democracy 
(see Lenard, 2012; Warren, 2017). At a practical level, democracy requires a certain del-
egation of labour in which the majority – with scarce time, resource or knowledge – give 
agency to elected politicians to pass laws and devise policies in their better interests. In 
turn, specialised agencies, arm’s-length bodies, civil service departments and judicial sys-
tems implement or regulate those laws and policies. This chain of delegation requires 
continuous trust judgements by principals (i.e. citizens) about agents (i.e. politicians and 
policy-makers), but the efficacy of those relationships also arguably rests on a mutual 
recognition of vertical trust. Put simply, for trust to facilitate good governance and effec-
tive representation or for distrust to stimulate change (especially where formal institu-
tions or accountability measures fail), politicians must accurately perceive those 
sentiments and act accordingly (for similar theoretical arguments, see Bottoms and 
Tankebe’s (2012) ‘dialogic approach’ towards police legitimacy).
In parallel literatures on crisis management, similar arguments manifest via a strong 
emphasis on vertical coordination, which refers to cooperation between crisis responders 
who are otherwise situated in some form of hierarchical relationship to one another (see 
Boin et al., 2017; McGuire et al., 2010). Thus, existing research explores the ways that 
leaders at the political centre frame and communicate crises as well as public views of 
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and reactions to unpredictable or significant shocks (for a review, see De Clercy and 
Ferguson, 2016). There is clearly appraisive potential to both top-down and bottom-up 
analytical lenses. However, there is even more potential to conjoining these multiple per-
spectives to examine the interaction of leaders and followers in crisis scenarios and, in 
particular, exploring the factors that facilitate or hinder crisis coordination. It is here that 
vertical political trust, as well as the latter’s perceptions thereof, may be important for 
both elite policy decisions and mass compliance therewith.
Issues of horizontal trust between politicians are of equal, if not more, importance in 
democracies generally and during crises in particular. Related arguments were originally 
coined by William G. Sumner (1913) in his theory of ‘antagonistic cooperation’ whereby, 
for example, political elites may enter into limited yet durable partnerships to pursue 
mutual and commonly beneficial goals for society at large (see also Best, 2009: 113). In 
parliaments and legislatures at a regional, national and international level, politicians 
must work towards consensus (albeit more so in multi-party proportional representation 
systems than in single-member plurality systems). Across political parties, antagonistic 
cooperation can be observed in committee systems where politicians of all partisan per-
suasions come together to scrutinise legislation and pursue common policy interests. 
Within parties, high levels of trust and low levels of distrust between elected members are 
required to bind individuals who are otherwise competing contenders for vote, office, and 
policy success.
During crises, the political stakes attached to antagonistic cooperation are much higher. 
Politicians are required to lay aside pre-existing disputes, suspend long-term strategic 
ambition and resolve emerging tensions in order to collaborate by, inter alia, granting 
emergency powers to governments and supporting government policies in public-facing 
communication. On the one hand, such decisions give  the executive a [greater] monopoly 
on state resource at a time when all actors must also seek to mitigate the political conse-
quences of crisis fallout. On the other hand, crises like COVID-19 disrupt carefully con-
structed webs of checks and balances that usually institutionalise distrust in representative 
democracies (see also Sztompka, 1999; Tilly, 2005). To reach consensus and facilitate 
effective crisis management, politicians on all sides must have acceptably low levels of 
distrust and relatively acceptable levels of trust in one another. To be more precise, they 
must be willing to accept vulnerability when entering into discussions, joint decisions 
and/or unique legislative arrangements with other politicians whom they ordinarily disa-
gree with, compete against or criticise.
Theorising Political Trust and Behaviour during COVID-19
To better theorise and clarify relationships between trust and governance in the context of 
COVID-19, this section presents a specific conception of trust and a series of related 
hypotheses. In contrast to studies of generalised political trust based on holistic single-
item survey indicators (e.g. Feldman, 1983; Hooghe, 2011), this article takes a normative 
stance in assuming that political trust is decidedly multi-level, multi-dimensional and 
reflective of interpersonal projections in a specific domain of action (see also Chan, 
2019). These propositions are developed in Figure 1, which distinguishes between trust 
as an action (decisions or behaviours such as complying with COVID-19 policies) and 
trust as a series of internalised psychological processes that inform those actions. 
Specifically, political behaviours or decisions are catalysed by (a) a trustor’s generalised 
propensity to trust and their particularised policy/government evaluations as mediated by 
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(b) their multifaceted trust judgements about the trustworthiness of a trustee (e.g. 
politicians).
This model is underpinned by three key arguments. First, all individuals have a pro-
pensity to trust that is non-political and, often subconsciously, shapes their willingness ‘to 
be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor 
or control that other party’ (Mayer et al., 1995: 712). Second, prior performance matters. 
An extant literature in the trust-as-evaluation tradition has shown a strong link between 
government performance and political trust. As Huseby (2000: 10) concludes, ‘poor per-
formance in salient political issues leads to negative evaluations of government perfor-
mance, which in turn influences citizens’ support for the political system’. Third, 
cognitive, affective and behavioural-intentional trust judgements about a relevant trustee 
(i.e. politicians making policy announcements) act as ‘psychological conduits’ (see 
Hamm et al., 2019: 2) for both (a) the behavioural execution of a trustor’s propensity to 
trust in a specific domain of action (i.e. politics and the COVID-19 crisis) and (b) the 
utilisation of prior policy or performance evaluations in determining behavioural 
responses to political mandates or situations (for a review of these three ‘trust dimen-
sions’, see Lewicki et al., 2006).
The heuristic potential of all three sets of trust judgements is highly relevant in politics 
and even more so in crises when politicians and publics not only (a) share in asymmetries 
of information about one another’s characteristics and attitudes but also (b) face a low-
information environment about the policy topic requiring cooperation. On the one hand, 
citizens (i.e. trustors) are more likely to abide by behavioural restrictions when they also 
(a) believe that those issuing such demands (i.e. trustees) know what they are doing, have 
common interests in mind and communicate truthfully (i.e. cognitive trust); (b) feel posi-
tively about trustees generally and hold positive expectations about their future behaviour 
Figure 1. Simple System Model of Political Trust and Behaviour.
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(i.e. affective trust); and (c) already view trustees as an open or dependable source of sup-
port (i.e. behavioural-intentional trust). These same contentions hold when considering 
politicians’ support for policy decisions and, by implication, horizontal as well as vertical 
coordination during crises like COVID-19. Put simply, positive cognitive, affective and 
behavioural-intentional trust judgements of other politicians may reduce uncertainty 
when entering into precarious, high-risk or co-dependent policy decisions. At the same 
time, politicians who believe that they are judged positively across these factors may be 
more likely to act decisively in risky or uncertain situations due to an enhanced sense of 
public support or, more strategically, greater electoral security:
H1: Citizens with higher levels of cognitive, affective and behavioural-intentional 
trust in politicians will be more compliant with COVID-19 restrictions.
H2: Politicians with higher levels of cognitive, affective and behavioural-intentional 
trust in other politicians will be more supportive of COVID-19 policy decisions.
H3: Politicians who perceive higher levels of cognitive, affective and behavioural-
intentional trust from the public will be more supportive of COVID-19 policy 
decisions.
Figure 1 also distinguishes conceptually between trust and distrust to avoid inaccu-
rate conflations of trust-based judgements and resultant actions that have very different 
psychological origins and implications. Although both trust and distrust might relate to 
judgements about the reliability or ‘trustworthiness’ of another, trust allows for the pos-
sibility of harm and facilitates co-operative behaviours, while distrust invokes an 
expectation of harm or betrayal and elicits very different actions to manage that risk 
(see also Lewicki et al., 1998: 439). In Figure 1, this distinction is invoked for all three 
facets of trust judgements, which run on two independent yet parallel scales of high/low 
trust and distrust. For example, an individual might think that politicians have lots of 
technical expertise (high cognitive trust) or they might believe that politicians waste a 
lot of public money (high cognitive distrust). These two cognitive judgements are not 
equivalent: the latter does not necessarily present itself in an absence of the former or 
vice versa. Both beliefs may be held simultaneously to varying degrees and, crucially, 
both imply very different conclusions about the (trustee...) that become salient in differ-
ent contexts of cooperation or action (for related discussions, see Bertsou, 2019).
In related literature on crisis management, Boin et al. (2017: 65–66) argue that ‘[i]n 
systems where local communities regard central (or higher) authorities with distrust, we 
may therefore expect problems with vertical coordination’. It is possible, therefore, that 
vertical distrust – understood in sum as an unhealthy cynicism about the incompetence, 
self-interest or inauthenticity of a trustee (i.e. cognitive distrust) accompanied by an 
active, angry and fearful expectation of harm or betrayal (i.e. affective distrust) – may 
propagate suspicion of centrally designed policy responses and, in this instance, inhibit 
compliance with COVID-19 policies. Similarly, cognitive and affective distrust among 
politicians, or perceptions of public distrust (of any kind), may stymie policy support by 
promoting blame management or opportunism rather than compromise, consensus or 
bold decision-making:
H4: Citizens with higher levels of cognitive and affective distrust in politicians will be 
less compliant with COVID-19 restrictions.
Weinberg 7
H5: Politicians with higher levels of cognitive and affective distrust in other politicians 
will be less supportive of COVID-19 policy decisions.
H6: Politicians who perceive higher levels of distrust from the public will be less sup-
portive of COVID-19 policy decisions.
In this instance, the symmetrical effects predicted of cognitive and affective trust and 
distrust are not anticipated to reproduce behavioural-intentional between trust and distrust. 
During a crisis that was unparalleled in scale and severity for most UK citizens, it is 
possible that those with higher levels of behavioural-intentional distrust (elsewhere char-
acterised as mistrust, for example, Zmerli and Van Der Meer, 2017) – who are already 
more likely to double-check political rhetoric and monitor [other] politicians’ actions – 
may have been more likely to comply with or support policy decisions where (a) uncer-
tainty about the consequences of non-compliance/non-support was high and (b) scientists 
and ‘evidence’ were at the forefront of decision-making about how to address the threat:
H7: Citizens with higher levels of behavioural-intentional distrust in politicians will be 
more compliant with COVID-19 restrictions.
H8: Politicians with higher levels of behavioural-intentional distrust in other politi-
cians will be more supportive of COVID-19 policy decisions.
Case Study: The United Kingdom
As a case study, the UK presents fertile ground for the study of political trust, on the one 
hand, and its relationship to political behaviours during the coronavirus pandemic, on the 
other. Will Jennings et al. (2017) have, in particular, painted a bleak picture of declining 
trust (and rising distrust) in UK politics. They conclude: ‘what it is that citizens object to 
about politics [. . .] is politicians and their behaviour rather than the political system’ 
(Jennings et al., 2017: 894). At the same time, survey data continue to reveal remarkable 
levels of public distrust and democratic despondency that crystallise around popular 
judgements about those who govern. The Hansard Society’s (2019: 3) audit of political 
engagement concluded: ‘[o]pinions of the systems of governing [in the UK] are at their 
lowest point in the 15 year Audit series – worse now than in the aftermath of the MPs’ 
expenses scandal’. Such studies highlight (a) the importance of politicians – as opposed 
to political institutions – when it comes to structuring the UK public’s political trust [dis-
trust] and (b) a pre-COVID-19 context in which ex ante political trust [distrust] in UK 
politicians was already detrimentally low [high].
At the same time, the UK’s official response to the COVID-19 crisis was initially 
characterised by indecision. The Government pursued a strategy of behavioural ‘nudging’ 
based on conscious and subconscious persuasion and encouragement (Parkinson, 2020). 
By early March 2020, this singled the UK out as a control case of sorts at a time when 
other nations with large numbers of cases (China, South Korea, Italy and Iran) and those 
with relatively few (Ireland, Norway and Denmark) had implemented stricter lockdown 
measures. With the number of COVID-19 cases in the UK rising rapidly, the number of 
deaths mounting and the projected pressures on the National Health Service (NHS) mon-
umental, the Government reversed its approach in favour of stringent protocols to keep 
people at home. The Coronavirus Act 2020 (C.7) (2020), which received Royal Assent on 
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25 March, was rushed through Parliament in just four sitting days. The Act allowed 
exceptional new forms of resourcing and funding for public bodies and local authorities 
as well as provisions for temporary and exceptional alterations to worker’s rights and the 
use of legal and policing powers to prohibit transmission of the virus (Coronavirus Act 
2020 (C.7), 2020). Despite these extraordinary new measures to combat the crisis, some 
UK citizens continued to defy official guidelines and legal instructions (Tominey et al., 
2020).
Methods
To substantiate the theoretical propositions outlined above with empirical analysis, this 
article draws on two quantitative, cross-sectional surveys fielded to UK politicians and 
the UK public at the height of the COVID-19 crisis.1 This section briefly discusses the 
research design, sample populations, survey content and robustness checks on key meas-
urement instruments.
Participants
A national sample of the UK public completed online surveys between 2 and 4 April 2020 
(just over a week after the UK entered its first social and economic lockdown). Survey 
participants were recruited via the crowd-working platform Prolific Academic. Prolific 
has been used for academic studies across the social sciences and compares favourably to 
other commonly used platforms such as MTurk (for a review, see Pallan and Schitter, 
2018). The survey was completed by 1200 participants from an eligible pool of 31,787 
using nationally representative quotas for gender, age and ethnicity (see Online Appendix 
A). Quality control questions and attention filters were used to trim the sample population 
(final N = 1145), and successful completes were rewarded with a payment of 1.15 GBP.2 
Politically, the sample contained more Labour Party voters (37%) than Conservatives 
(30%), but participants were evenly dispersed across two 11-point Left–Right scales of 
economic ideology (median = 5, mean = 4.68, range = 10) and social ideology (median = 5, 
mean = 4.3, range = 10).
Similar online surveys were fielded on the same day to local UK politicians (council-
lors). Emails were sent to 3013 elected councillors in office on 2 April who were identifi-
able in the Democracy Club database of political candidates. Councillors were also 
encouraged to participate by a notice in the Local Government Association’s electronic 
newsletter. In total, 356 councillors started the survey and 285 completed it (response rate 
of 9.5%). A further 28 were removed for failing quality control questions or attention 
filters (final N = 257). Importantly, this sample is diverse and representative of the target 
population (i.e. elected councillors) across a number of key characteristics such as gen-
der, age, ethnicity and education (see Online Appendix A). Politically, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat representatives are slightly over-represented (36% and 32% of the sample, 
respectively) compared to Conservatives (17% of the sample); the average tenure of par-
ticipants in local government is 9 years (median = 6 years, range = 48 years).
Although locally elected politicians were not at the forefront of official media 
briefings about COVID-19, nor involved in voting on the emergency powers granted 
to the national government in Westminster, they were placed ‘at the heart of [the] coro-
navirus response’ (Peters, 2020). Councils were tasked with delivering on the high 
expectations set by the national government in terms of, inter alia, providing a network 
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of support (e.g. food, medicine, shelter) to those most vulnerable during the lockdown 
as well as enforcing lockdown measures in their localities (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government (MHCLG), 2020). The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD, 2020) report on the territorial impacts of 
COVID-19 (including across the UK) provides supporting evidence for this claim. It 
concluded, for example:
Regional and local governments are at the forefront of the COVID-19 health crisis and its social 
and economic consequences. They are in charge of significant responsibilities in the different 
areas impacted by the COVID-19 crisis [. . .] In many countries, subnational governments are 
responsible for critical aspects of health care [. . .] (OECD, 2020: 9).
For similar reasons, Kevin Orr (2009) argues that local governments offer an undevel-
oped locale for studies of crisis leadership.3 Councillors’ attitudes towards the UK’s 
strategic political response to COVID-19 are, then, significant and even more worthy of 
attention at the time of writing as the national government continues to broker locally 
acceptable lockdown measures for future waves of the virus.
Measurement Instruments
Participants completed questions about their socio-economic, demographic and partisan 
characteristics as well as survey batteries measuring their political trust and distrust, psy-
chological propensity to trust, and either (a) behavioural compliance with a range of offi-
cial COVID-19 public health guidelines (mass sample) or (b) support for a range of policy 
responses to the crisis (elite sample). Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for 
these measures are reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Propensity to Trust and Policy Satisfaction. As discussed at length, trust/distrust or judge-
ments thereof in any single domain of action such as politics may be grounded on (or 
reflective of) an individual’s generalised willingness to accept vulnerability as well as 
perceptions of policy performance (Figure 1). To assess propensity to trust, participants 
responded to the following three statements (adapted from Hamm et al., 2019):
1. I am open to letting others make decisions about issues that are important to me.
2. I am comfortable with others having control over my future.
3. I am willing to let others resolve problems that are critical to me, even though I 
cannot monitor all of their actions.
Participants rated themselves against each statement on a scale of 0–10 (where 0 = ‘not 
like me at all’, 10 = ‘completely like me’). Propensity to trust was then calculated as the 
average score given to these three items. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients suggest that the 
scale has strong internal reliability in both the elite sample (α = 0.81) and the mass sample 
(α = 0.85). To assess pre-existing evaluations of COVID-related policy performance at 
the time of data collection, participants were asked to report their satisfaction with the 
way UK politicians (at any tier of governance) had handled the coronavirus outbreak in 
the early days of the pandemic. Respondents answered on a five-point Likert-type scale 











Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations (Public Sample).
N Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Core constructs
1. Propensity to trust (0–10) 1145 3.61 2.04 1 0.22/0.27 −0.17/–0.23 0.20/0.28 −0.17/–0.24 0.17/0.22 −0.13/–0.16 0.19 −0.01
2. Cognitive trust (0–7) 1145/1145 3.99/3.40 1.10/1.11 1 −0.76/–0.74 0.86/0.83 −0.74/–0.74 −0.60/0.51 −0.05/–0.17 0.25/0.46 0.02/–0.03
3. Cognitive distrust (0–7) 1145/1145 4.52/5.28 1.08/0.85 1 −0.70/–0.65 0.81/0.77 −0.51/–0.41 0.15/0.25 −0.18/–0.37 −0.02/–0.02
4. Affective trust (0–7) 1145/1145 4.37/3.94 1.18/1.23 1 −0.69/–0.67 0.59/0.53 −0.04/–0.14 0.28/0.45 0.02/0.02
5. Affective distrust (0–7) 1145/1145 4.05/4.76 1.15/1.11 1 −0.49/–0.44 0.19/0.32 −0.21/–0.40 −0.03/–0.01
6. Behavioural trust (0–7) 1145/1145 3.82/3.44 1.17/1.17 1 .19/.02 .10/20 −.03/–.07
7. Behavioural distrust (0–7) 1145/1145 3.43/3.98 1.32/1.40 1 −0.11/–0.23 −0.00/0.05
8. Satisfaction (0–5) 1145 2.96 1.15 1 0.03
9. Compliance (0–5) 1145 4.56 0.57 1
Key covariates
Age (0–4)a 1145 − − −0.03 −0.04/0.04 0.10/0.05 −0.02/0.06 0.01/–0.04 0.08/0.10 0.05/0.04 0.05 −0.07
Sex (Woman) 1145 (579) − − −0.13 0.10/0.03 −0.07/–0.05 0.08/0.01 −0.09/–0.09 0.02/–0.05 −0.03/–0.11 0.02 0.11
Qualifications (0–5)b 1145 − − −0.06 −0.04/–0.07 −0.02/0.03 −0.06/–0.08 −0.04/0.02 −0.01/–0.01 0.03/0.09 −0.12 0.22
Ethnicity (White) 1145 (977) − − 0.07 0.04/–0.01 −0.02/0.05 0.06/0.02 −0.03/0.04 0.05/0.02 0.01/0.06 0.10 0.08
Occupation (‘manual’ or unemployed) 1145 (193) − − 0.01 −0.00/0.04 −0.01/–0.07 −0.01/0.02 0.00/–0.04 −0.06/–0.01 −0.08/–0.07 0.02 −0.15
Partisanship (Conservative) 1145 (348) − − 0.06 0.02/0.24 0.04/–0.17 0.05/0.26 0.01/–0.21 −0.01/0.21 −0.05/–0.09 0.33 −0.03
Partisan match
YES – with councillor/ 1145 (412) − − 0.08/ −0.07/ 0.11/ −0.06/ 0.17/ 0.01/  
YES – with MP 1145 (437) − − 0.05 0.19 −0.17 0.21 −0.18 0.38 −0.08 0.13 −0.02
Brexit vote (leave) 1039 (399) − − 9.00 −9.09/9.04 0.16/0.02 −0.07/0.06 0.13/–0.03 −0.02/0.07 −0.01/–0.09 0.22 −0.16
Fear of COVID-19 (0–5)c 1145 3.36 1.04 0.01 0.03/0.04 0.04/0.00 0.04/0.04 0.06/0.03 0.05/0.06 0.10/0.05 −0.01 0.00
Where appropriate, data are reported for trust judgements about councillors (left-hand side of the slash) and MPs (right-hand side of the slash). Correlation coefficients in bold are statistically significant 
at p < 0.05 or less.
a‘Age’ is a numeric scale comprising four categories: 18–30, 31–45, 46–60 and 61+.
b‘Qualifications’ is a numeric scale comprising five categories: none, apprenticeship, A-levels or vocational diploma, bachelor’s degree and postgraduate degree.







Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations (Elite Sample).
N Mean St. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Core constructs
1. Propensity to trust (0–10) 257 3.65 2.03 1 0.19/−0.04 −0.16/0.03 0.22/−0.02 −0.17/0.07 0.19/−0.09 −0.29/−0.15 0.12 0.12
2. Cognitive trust (0–7) 257/257 4.98/5.44 1.54/0.084 1 −0.89/−0.75 0.92/0.79 −0.86/−0.72 0.84/0.63 −0.37/0.29 0.16/0.07 0.16/0.12
3. Cognitive distrust (0–7) 257/257 3.38/3.17 1.64/1.09 1 −0.85/−0.63 0.89/0.76 −0.81/−0.44 0.38/–0.21 −0.14/−0.10 −0.15/0.01
4. Affective trust (0–7) 257/257 5.09/5.49 1.57/0.80 1 −0.85/−0.62 0.82/0.58 −0.35/0.27 0.14/0.05 0.15/0.16
5. Affective distrust (0–7) 257/257 3.29/2.83 1.70/1.11 1 −0.82/−0.50 0.38/–0.14 −0.18/−0.07 −0.21/−0.05
6. Behavioural trust (0–7) 257/257 5.00/5.95 1.52/0.67 1 −0.32/0.15 0.14/0.03 0.22/0.18
7. Behavioural distrust (0–7) 257/257 5.51/3.96 0.90/1.12 1 −0.18/–0.02 −0.01/0.08
8. Satisfaction (0–5) 257 2.45 1.22 1 0.15
9. Policy support (0–7) 251 5.95 0.80 1
Key covariates
Age (0–4)a 255 − − −0.10 −0.02/0.08 0.01/–0.10 0.01/0.12 −0.02/−0.11 −0.01/0.07 −0.07/0.02 −0.04 −0.00
Sex (woman) 252 (91) − − −0.18 −0.08/0.06 0.09/0.04 −0.09/0.05 0.06/–0.05 −0.09/0.01 −0.05/0.03 −0.08 0.05
Qualifications (0–5)b 256 − − 0.05 −0.08/−0.04 0.05/0.02 −0.10/−0.08 0.06/0.05 −0.11/0.01 −0.01/−0.12 −0.04 −0.00
Safe seat (YES) 254 (218) − − −0.01 0.03/0.20 −0.06/−0.06 0.01/0.17 0.01/–0.10 0.07/0.18 −0.06/0.17 0.01 0.08
Partisanship (Conservative) 257 (43) − − 0.03 0.09/0.10 −0.12/−0.12 0.08/0.08 −0.17/−0.12 0.13/0.07 −0.07/0.03 0.59 0.17
Brexit (leave) 253 (33) − − −0.02 0.02/0.16 0.02/–0.11 0.01/0.16 −0.07/−0.09 0.05/0.09 0.02/0.05 0.38 0.03
Fear of COVID-19 (0–5)c 257 3.03 0.96 −0.01 0.07/0.03 −0.14/−0.03 0.07/0.11 −0.10/–0.02 0.12/0.08 −0.03/0.03 −0.13 0.30
Where appropriate, data are reported for trust judgements about other councillors (left-hand side of the slash) and other-to-self perceptions of public trust judgements (right-hand side of the slash). 
Correlation coefficients in bold are statistically significant at p < 0.05 or less.
a‘Age’ is a numeric scale comprising four categories: 18–30, 31–45, 46–60 and 61+.
b‘Qualifications’ is a numeric scale comprising five categories: none, apprenticeship, A-levels or vocational diploma, bachelor’s degree and postgraduate degree.
c‘Fear of COVID-19’ was measured on a five-point Likert-type scale running from ‘not scared at all’ to ‘very scared’.
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Policy Compliance and Support. Public participants were asked to self-report their compli-
ance with a range of public health policies and guidelines issued by the UK Government 
and devolved administrations in response to the COVID-19 crisis. Four of these guide-
lines had become legally enforceable at the time of the survey (including social distanc-
ing, limited outdoor excursions, a hiatus to all but essential travel and home working in a 
range of industries). Responses to these four items are aggregated into a single ‘compli-
ance’ score for inferential analyses reported later in this article (see also Table 1). Partici-
pants recorded their level of compliance on a five-point Likert-type scale running from 
‘not at all’ to ‘all of the time’. Three items were reverse-coded to avoid scale-based 
effects, and the order of items was randomised between participants.
Councillors self-reported their support for 10 policy approaches to governing through 
the pandemic. Seven of these, such as covering the wages of those unable to work, became 
official policy announcements either just before or just after this survey was issued. 
Responses to these seven items are aggregated into a single ‘policy support’ score in 
inferential analyses reported later in this article (see also Table 2). Participants recorded 
their level of support for each policy on a seven-point Likert-type scale running from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.
Political Trust and Distrust (Judgements). A new 24-item battery of political trust (hence-
forth PTB-24) was designed a priori to capture cognitive, affective and behavioural-inten-
tional trust judgements about politicians (Online Appendix B). The PTB-24 contains 12 
items measuring cognitive judgements (4 each for politicians’ ability, benevolence and 
integrity with 2 in each case measuring trust and 2 measuring distrust); 6 items measuring 
affective judgements (3 each for trust and distrust); and 6 items measuring behavioural-
intentional judgements (3 each for trust and distrust). Participants responded to each item 
on a seven-point Likert-type scale running from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’; 
scores were calculated as the average response to those items measuring each facet. 
Exemplar items include the following:
1. Politicians distort the facts to make policies look good. (Cognitive distrust/
Integrity focused)
2. You feel hopeful that politicians can improve people’s lives, including yours. 
(Affective trust)
3. You monitor the behaviour of politicians closely. (Behavioural-intentional 
distrust)
This survey battery was constructed in accordance with rules laid out by Cummings and 
Bromiley (1996: 306), insofar as (a) the items did not use the word trust (which stimulates 
a range of abstract and subjective connotations), (b) approximately equal numbers of 
items were designed for each dimension of the theoretical model, (c) items were derived 
from theoretical and empirical work on defining and measuring attitudes generally and 
(d) items were kept as simple as possible and relatable to the target population.
Mass and elite samples completed the PTB-24 twice each. Items were presented in ran-
domised order between participants to counter order effects and survey fatigue. In each itera-
tion of the survey tool, the target of trust or distrust (i.e. the trustee) was altered (see Online 
Appendix B). For the public, the target of trust differed between local politicians (i.e. council-
lors) and national politicians (i.e. MPs) to assess whether or not levels of trust/distrust in politi-
cians – as well as the effects thereof – differ across tiers of governance. For politicians, the 
target of trust differed between fellow councillors (specifically those in leadership positions) 
Weinberg 13
and themselves (as perceived by the public). To test the fit of the data to the theoretical model 
proposed, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted in R using a maximum likelihood esti-
mator with robust standard errors (MLR). Cognitive, affective and behavioural-intentional 
trust and distrust were treated as six latent and correlated factors. The results suggest a strong 
fit for public judgements of councillors (χ2 = 701.32, df = 237, Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) = 0.97, Root Mean Square Error of Appreciation (RMSEA) = 0.04, Standardised Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.04) and MPs (χ2 = 793.56, df = 237, CFI = 0.95, 
RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04) as well as elite judgements of other councillors (χ2 = 405.24, 
df = 237, CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMR = 0.04) and elite perceptions of public judgements 
(χ2 = 333.48, df = 237, CFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.05). Cronbach’s alpha coeffi-
cients for the six latent factors also suggest strong internal reliability (ranging from 0.62 to 
0.94 across all four sets of observations).
Results
This section proceeds in three parts. The first presents descriptive statistics on elite and 
mass policy-related attitudes and behaviours at the height of the COVID-19 crisis. The 
second section reports levels of cognitive, affective and behavioural-intentional trust and 
distrust among elites and masses. The third and final section analyses the relationship 
between trust/distrust and mass behavioural compliance with, and elite support for, crisis-
related public policy decisions taken in the UK during the coronavirus pandemic.
COVID-19 Attitudes and Behaviours
Just 10 days after the UK’s first lockdown began, vertical coordination between the central 
response to COVID-19, organised by politicians and their advisors, and its on-the-ground 
implementation, dependent on citizen compliance, appears to have faltered (Figure 2). Just 
Figure 2. Frequency Chart of Public Compliance with Official and Unofficial COVID-19 
Guidelines.
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83% of the public sample were practising social distancing ‘all of the time’ as required to 
stop the spread of the virus, and a substantial number of participants continued to go outside 
for non-essential purposes. At the same time, the public were engaging in unhelpful behav-
iours that directly inhibited crisis management. Almost half of the sample continued to 
stockpile food and household products to some extent despite official advice against such 
behaviours from politicians as well as retailers. And regardless of a call from Prime Minister 
Boris Johnson and the NHS for an ‘army of volunteers’, the vast majority of participants 
were unlikely to offer their time or support.
Among politicians, horizontal coordination (measured as policy agreement) also appears 
to have faltered along partisan fault lines (Figure 3). Some of these differences reflect long-
standing ideological traditions in the UK’s political parties on the Left and Right. For 
instance, Conservative councillors reported higher agreement with financial packages 
aimed at supporting UK business. By contrast, Labour councillors reported much higher 
support for covering the wages of those individuals who were unable to work or those made 
redundant during the pandemic (81% ‘strongly agreed’ compared to just 51% of 
Conservatives). The largest disagreements between elected councillors occurred where 
policy options involved a transfer of power to the incumbent Conservative Government in 
Westminster. For example, more than 50% of Conservative councillors ‘strongly agreed’ 
with an emergency powers act compared to fewer than 15% of both Labour and Liberal 
Democrat councillors. Taken together, these statistics suggest that local politicians were 
governing without uniform consensus at the height of the COVID-19 crisis.
Political Trust and Distrust
Data collected from four iterations of the PTB-24 point to three important observations. 
First, public trust [distrust] was higher [lower] in councillors than MPs at the height of the 
COVID-19 crisis (Figure 4). The difference between the public’s cognitive trust and distrust 
Figure 3. Frequency Chart of Politicians’ Support for COVID-19 Policy Options.
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in MPs is particularly stark, illustrating not only a lack of conscious belief in their technical 
ability, benevolence or integrity (i.e. trust) but also a conscious expectation of harm or 
betrayal across those same characteristics (i.e. distrust). Second, councillors’ perceived pub-
lic trust [distrust] in themselves as politicians was actually higher [lower] at the height of the 
COVID-19 crisis than their own trust [distrust] in other councillors (Figure 5). This would 
suggest, at a broad level, that local politicians felt that the public placed more trust [less 
distrust] in them personally than they placed in their own colleagues.
Of the different facets of distrust measured here, only councillors’ self-reported 
behavioural-intentional distrust in other councillors rises above the scale mid-point. 
This may reflect something unique about the dynamics of behavioural-intentional dis-
trust based on monitory decisions at a horizontal level in politics. By virtue of holding 
political office, politicians can command responses from one another (and leaderships 
in particular) on key concerns via informal means (e.g. conversations over a shared 
lunch break) or formal avenues (e.g. written questions or committee hearings) in a way 
that reduces the foundations for horizontal cognitive and affective distrust while 
simultaneously bolstering the avenues through which to exercise horizontal behav-
ioural-intentional distrust.
Third, councillors’ perceived public trust [distrust] in themselves as politicians was 
substantially higher [lower] than the public’s actual trust [distrust] in councillors at the 
height of the COVID-19 crisis (Figure 6). In particular, the gap between real and per-
ceived behavioural-intentional trust is stark. This would suggest, based on items in the 
PTB-24, that councillors believe the public is much more likely to speak openly with 
them, seek help from them, or even vote for them than is the case in reality. After complet-
ing this iteration of the PTB-24, councillors were asked to describe ‘who’ they had envi-
sioned as constituting ‘the public’ when responding to each item. An overwhelming 
majority (88%) claimed to be thinking about all residents in their council area, whereas 
just 8% pin-pointed their direct electors and only 4% highlighted the wider British public. 
Figure 4. Vertical Trust and Distrust by the Public in Politicians.
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These data suggest, on the one hand, that politicians perceive vertical trust within geo-
graphical representative blocs and, on the other hand, that they remain conscious of 
broader public opinion beyond their own vote base.
Figure 5. Political Trust and Distrust (Horizontal and Vertical Perceptions) among UK 
Politicians.
Figure 6. Vertical Political Trust and Distrust (Perceived and Real) between UK Politicians and 
the Public.
Weinberg 17
Political Trust/Distrust and COVID-19. This article now presents path analyses carried out in 
R using the Lavaan package to establish whether or not political trust/distrust was associ-
ated with levels of vertical and horizontal coordination at the height of the COVID-19 
crisis (as per H1–H8). To be precise, (a) trust and distrust judgements were regressed on 
participants’ propensity to trust as well as their satisfaction with politicians’ handling of 
the COVID-19 crisis at the time of data collection; (b) compliance with official COVID-
19 policies (mass sample) or support thereof (elite sample) was regressed on participants’ 
trust and distrust judgements; and (c) a constellation of salient control variables were 
included (as per Tables 1 and 2). Four models were calculated in total to utilise each of 
the four iterations of the PTB-24 completed by the sample populations.4 All models were 
run using maximum likelihood estimation with robust (Huber–White) standard errors, 
and the six trust/distrust factors were allowed to co-vary freely. The full results can be 
found in Online Appendix C.
As anticipated, vertical trust in MPs shares a meaningful relationship with levels of 
behavioural compliance (Figure 7). In particular, those with the most affective trust in 
MPs complied with legal guidelines approximately 9% more regularly than those with the 
worst affective appraisals of MPs. Put another way, the more faith, confidence and hope 
that participants had in MPs generally (affective trust), the more likely they also were to 
abide by COVID-19 policies (H1 partially supported). Antithetically, behavioural-inten-
tional trust shares a negative relationship with public compliance in the present sample 
Figure 7. Public Trust in MPs and Compliance with COVID-19 Policies.
N = 1032, χ2 = 185.94, df = 45, CFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.03. Only statistically significant, second 
order, predictors of compliance are displayed.
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(H1 partially unsupported). To be precise, the more that participants expressed openness 
towards and dependence on MPs, the less likely they were to comply. This is an instinc-
tively anomalous result that may be confounded by variables outside of these models.
There is no evidence to suggest that cognitive and affective distrust in MPs was associ-
ated with lower rates of compliance during the UK’s first lockdown (H4 unsupported). 
Yet in line with prior expectations, behavioural-intentional distrust in MPs does share a 
positive association with levels of public compliance (H7 supported). At the same time, 
no meaningful relationships emerge between the public’s trust/distrust in councillors and 
their levels of behavioural compliance at the height of the COVID-19 crisis. This may 
reflect the saliency of trust in national politicians at a time when power was more central-
ised than usual, and crisis-related behavioural policies such as those tested in this study 
were issued directly from Westminster.
Analyses carried out on the elite sample suggest a strong association between partici-
pants’ behavioural-intentional trust in other councillors and their policy support during 
the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic (H2 partially supported; Figure 8). On aver-
age, councillors with the most positive behavioural-intentional trust judgements of other 
politicians scored 18% higher for policy support than those with the lowest levels of hori-
zontal behavioural-intentional trust in this sample. There is no evidence, however, that 
horizontal distrust (cognitive or affective) correlated with lower policy support (H5 
unsupported) or that behavioural-intentional distrust could have increased it (H8 unsup-
ported). Neither did a sound empirical relationship emerge between councillors’ per-
ceived levels of public trust/distrust and their policy support (H3 and H6 unsupported), 
although perceptions of both cognitive distrust and behavioural-intentional trust were 
statistically significant at p < 0.10. Subject to further research, these results suggest that 
horizontal trust may matter more for crisis management, and for horizontal coordination 
between politicians in particular, than strategic vertical calculations based on poll ratings 
or perceptions of public support.
For students of trust, and political trust in particular, it is worth noting that participants’ 
propensity to trust and policy satisfaction were, as hypothesised, strong predictors of the 
public’s trust and distrust in both councillors and MPs (Online Appendix C). Put simply, 
the higher a participant’s propensity to trust or COVID-19 policy satisfaction, the higher 
[lower] their cognitive, affective and behavioural-intentional trust [distrust] judgements 
about politicians. The same is true for councillors’ horizontal trust/distrust in other politi-
cians (Figure 8), but the theoretical paths proposed in Figure 1 do not hold for councillors’ 
perceptions of public trust and distrust. It is possible that strategic electoral considerations 
(and associated attitudinal variables) may override politicians’ psychological propensity 
to trust as the basis for vertical trust perceptions. In this instance, for example, council-
lors’ election margins are positively correlated with higher levels of perceived cognitive, 
affective and behavioural-intentional trust (see Table 2).
Discussion
This article provides a 360-degree appraisal of political trust (as well as distrust) and its 
effect on policy success in the UK at the height of the COVID-19 crisis. From a top-
down perspective, behavioural-intentional trust between politicians does appear to have 
improved horizontal coordination. Where politicians felt more able to speak openly 
with their colleagues on council leaderships or seek help from them when necessary, 
they were also more willing to agree with difficult policy decisions that needed to be 
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implemented during the COVID-19 crisis. In terms of understanding the broader rela-
tionship between trust and governance, this is a positive finding that supports the insti-
tutionalisation of distrust in our democratic institutions (e.g. Sztompka, 1999; Tilly, 
2005). Put simply, political disagreements and policy formulations should be chan-
nelled into the democratic media of debate and consultation within legislatures wher-
ever possible. Such arrangements necessarily reduce the costs of entering into 
trust-based relationships, diminish the saliency of distrust and, in turn, may lead to 
improved horizontal relations in times of crisis.
From a bottom-up perspective, this article finds important links between political trust, 
distrust and the public’s compliance with policy measures during the COVID-19 crisis. In 
particular, affectively driven vertical trust by the public in politicians (specifically MPs) 
appears to have aided adherence to otherwise large-scale and anti-social changes to their 
lifestyles. As politicians make difficult decisions about how to govern second or future 
waves of COVID-19 successfully (or indeed other public health emergencies), they 
should seek to increase the affective ties inherent in trust-based relationships with those 
they govern. Existing research on leadership styles in both the public and private sectors 
suggests that politicians may heighten ‘follower’ trust by making a number of strategic 
decisions to signal trustworthiness (for a meta-analysis of relevant studies, see Legood 
et al., 2020). Examples of such decisions are provided in Table 3. As per Figure 1, these 
recommendations are premised on the belief that
[. . .] where trust refers to the act of trusting or not trusting [such as complying with Covid-19 
measures], trustworthiness entails an evaluation of those criteria that constitute trust and 
consequently, influences both the direction and intensity of any decision to act in a trusting 
manner (Bews and Rossouw, 2002: 378).
Figure 8. Path Analysis of Elite Trust in Other Politicians and Support for COVID-19 Policies.
N = 245, χ2 = 53.79, df = 38, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.04. Only statistically significant regression 
slopes between selected variables are displayed. Non-significant regression pathways for selected predictors 
have been faded out as a dotted line. Standardised beta coefficients.
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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Service leadership Leaders express concerns for 
individual needs and prioritise 
higher intrinsic goals and 
motivations for others and 
oneself.
Politicians visit or consult different 
communities (by geography, religion, 
age, occupational sector etc.) and 
respond directly to their needs with 
a clear plan of action.
Consistency Leaders state claims or role 
model behaviours in a consistent 
way until a critical juncture calls 
for changes to rhetoric and 
action.
Politicians communicate a clear 
system of COVID-19 guidelines 
or legal restrictions, explain when 
and why these are introduced, and 
then apply this system fairly and 
routinely. In doing so, they establish 
and honour a social contract with 
the public.
Competence Leaders showcase the expertise, 
knowledge or skills needed to 
meet trust-based obligations in 
context.
Politicians draw heavily on 
scientific evidence to justify policy 
decisions and to guide public-facing 
communication.
Honesty and credibility Leaders provide the public with 
truthful justifications for action 
and avoid deviation, redaction or 
moral compromise in order to 
build credibility and reliability.
Politicians are transparent about 
the reasons for COVID-19 policy 
decisions and share all available and 
pertinent information with the public 
in order to justify those decisions. 
Where policies fail, politicians 
provide truthful explanations rather 
than displacing blame elsewhere.
Value alignment Leaders describe policy goals and 
behaviours in line with hegemonic 
social or cultural notions of what 
is important or unimportant, 
appropriate or inappropriate, right 
or wrong.
Politicians communicate policy 
decisions and ongoing restrictions 
in terms of generally agreed and 
commonly held psychological 
values such as caring for others, 
collective endurance and resilience, 
the ‘common good’, protecting 
the vulnerable, social security and 
stability.
Direct and interactive 
engagement
Leaders seek out or create 
regular opportunities to meet 
followers, to listen to their 
concerns or ideas, and to engage 
them in meaningful dialogue.
Politicians hold regular public 
briefings that address citizens’ 
concerns about the virus directly and 
institute mechanisms for the public 
to ask questions, express opinions, 
voice worries or request assistance.
Role model idealised 
behaviours
Leaders stand by their own 
decisions and actively illustrate 
the behaviours that they demand 
of followers.
Politicians follow policy measures 
stringently and are publically visible 
in doing so. Where colleagues 
breach policy measures in their 
own behaviour, they are publicly 
reprimanded to illustrate the 
severity and universality of the 
constraints.
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When the stakes of non-compliance are high as in the case of the COVID-19 crisis, politi-
cians must utilise that which is in their control: that is, the characteristics they demon-
strate for citizens in order to (a) inspire positive trust judgements based on hope, 
confidence and assurance, which then (b) invite reciprocal trust-based behaviour.
It is worth noting that the leadership strategies outlined in Table 3 are largely antithetical 
to a more transactional model of political leadership taken in the UK and elsewhere during 
the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, policy compliance and support have been incentivised 
using performance monitoring (e.g. numbers of cases and deaths), contingent reward (e.g. 
promises of lighter restrictions or more funding), blame attribution (e.g. negative coverage 
of non-compliance or poor performance) and corrective action (e.g. local or hyper-localised 
lockdowns, fines and even curfews). Such transactional modes of leadership are unlikely to 
build trust (see Kelloway et al., 2005) or adequately account for the range of socio-eco-
nomic, demographic and political covariates that also frame when, why and how people can 
afford to comply (see additional results reported in Online Appendix C).
The negative association between behavioural-intentional trust and public compliance 
found in this study does indicate, however, that some types of trust may not always be 
productive. On the one hand, citizens who are high in behavioural-intentional trust, and are 
otherwise comfortable rescinding political control to politicians, may be (a) less likely to 
pay attention to political news or participate in politics generally, and therefore (b) less 
likely to comply with radical policy decisions that demand high levels of public input. 
These are contentions that require further consideration. On the other hand, behavioural-
intentional trust judgements are also quite different from affective and cognitive appraisals 
of politicians, insofar as citizens may be cynically inclined towards representatives while 
still expressing high levels of behavioural-intentional trust. To be precise, citizens may 
vote for MPs due to partisan affiliations or seek support from MPs out of a respect for the 
institutional power they hold, rather than out of any genuine belief in their personal com-
petence, integrity or benevolence. Therefore, behavioural-intentional trust may not pro-
vide the same political capital as cognitive and affective trust, which are both personalised 
and directly warranted, when politicians try to enact policy decisions within and without 
crisis scenarios. Again, these inferences should inform future research in this area.
At the same time, distrust does not appear to have harmed behavioural compliance 
during the UK’s first COVID-19 lockdown. In fact, behavioural-intentional distrust – 
which manifests specifically as political scepticism – may even have improved vertical 
coordination. Zmerli and Van der Meer (2017: 1) argue that mistrust ‘plays an equally 
important role [as trust] in representative democracy. Critical citizens are more likely to 
engage in political activities and to keep office-holders accountable’ (see also Dalton and 
Welzel, 2014). Couched in citizens’ monitory relationship to their representatives, behav-
ioural-intentional distrust speaks to the accountability function of mistrust, which, in turn, 
may have led to critical yet productive policy cooperation between citizens and govern-
ments at a time when crisis-related policies were heavily couched in third-party scientific 
expertise. From a purely academic perspective, the asymmetric effects of trust and dis-
trust on behaviour presented in this study point to the benefits of understanding these two 
concepts as theoretically and methodologically distinct.
This research does, of course, suffer from a number of limitations. For example, elite 
data analysed here only provide insights about policy support among local politicians. 
Although councillors in the UK may have been at the proverbial coalface of implementing 
COVID-19 policy decisions in particular loci, those policies were instigated in Westminster. 
To fully appreciate the role of political trust and distrust demands a closer inspection of data 
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taken from politicians at multiple tiers of governance. It is also possible that participants 
(both public and politicians) over-estimated their compliance or policy support due to social 
desirability bias at a time when there were strong social and legal norms attached to the 
measures described in the questionnaire (see also Daoust et al., 2020).
Given the inherent difficulties of identifying causal effects with cross-sectional data, it 
is important to interpret the findings presented here as indicative subject to replication in 
parallel contexts. To be precise, I cannot be certain that participants’ political trust/distrust 
was actually exogenous in these analyses when (a) all variables were measured at the 
same time (and may therefore share simultaneity) and (b) unforeseen confounding vari-
ables may exist that impact both predictor and outcome variables (omitted variable bias). 
As such, these results should be read as correlative rather than predictive until corrobo-
rated elsewhere by appropriate panel data or instrumental variable analysis.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this article makes a number of standalone contribu-
tions to the extant study of trust and governance. Theoretically and methodologically, this 
article advances research on political trust by detaching trust – as a generalisable predisposi-
tion – from domain-specific trust/distrust judgements and field-testing that theory with a 
new measurement instrument. Substantively, this article turns a traditional research focus 
on public trust in politics on its head by asking how trusted or distrusted politicians actually 
feel and how much trust or distrust they extend to other elected representatives. Preliminary 
evidence presented here suggests, for example, that politicians do not make accurate 
appraisals of a low-trust, high-distrust civic culture and that their trust judgements of other 
politicians do matter for levels of horizontal coordination. These findings carry important 
implications for future studies of representative democracy and political behaviour.
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Notes
1. All elite and mass participants provided informed consent for this study, and ethical clearance was obtained 
in advance from the Departmental Ethics Committee at the University of Sheffield (Ref. 033900).
2. Items were randomly embedded in each survey that demanded specific responses and completion times 
were recorded for each survey. Participants were trimmed from the sample population if they failed to 
select the correct response to embedded questions or took too long/not long enough to complete their 
survey.
3. For examples of local government innovations and leadership during the COVID-19 crisis, visit https://
www.local.gov.uk/covid-19-good-council-practice
4. To address negative skew in both dependent variables, policy support and compliance were reflected, log-
transformed and then re-reflected to keep the scale running in the original direction.
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